U.S. Involvement in the Middle East: Israel Support vs. Other Drivers of Hostility

Introduction

Hostility toward the United States among certain Middle Eastern actors has long been attributed to U.S. support for Israel, but it also stems from other American actions in the region. In different eras – from the post-World War II period and Cold War through the post-9/11 wars – militant groups and adversarial governments have cited various grievances. This report examines whether anti-American enmity is primarily driven by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or if it would exist independently due to other U.S. policies (such as military bases in Saudi Arabia or support for authoritarian regimes). Key adversaries – including revolutionary Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and others – are analyzed to understand their motivations. We also explore whether enemies of the U.S. and Israel naturally align with each other or if they share foes largely because U.S. and Israeli policies are entangled.

Post-WWII and Cold War Foundations of Middle East Antagonism

American involvement in the Middle East expanded after World War II. The United States supported the creation of Israel in 1948 and soon became Israel’s principal backer in its conflicts with Arab neighbors. This alignment alienated many Arabs, as U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic aid enabled Israel to prevail in wars and occupy Arab landsciaotest.cc.columbia.edu. U.S. support for Israel – including vetoing U.N. measures critical of Israel and providing advanced weaponry – was widely seen as biased against Palestinian and Arab interestsciaotest.cc.columbia.edu. At the same time, the Cold War shaped U.S. regional strategy. Washington forged ties with conservative Arab monarchies and Iran’s Shah, aiming to contain Soviet influence. American policymakers often avoided antagonizing Arab states openly, even intervening against the 1956 Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt to win Arab goodwillwww2.kenyon.edu. Despite these efforts, Arab nationalist leaders like Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser still lambasted the U.S. as an imperialist supporter of Israel and local despots. By the 1970s, anti-Americanism had become common rhetoric for radical regimes, who blamed internal failures on the “Great Satan” in Washingtonwww2.kenyon.edu.

The 1973 Arab oil embargo demonstrated the centrality of the Israel issue: Arab states imposed economic costs on America for arming Israel. Nevertheless, U.S. policy continued to prioritize Israel’s security, contributing to a view among Arab populations that America was inherently anti-Arab. U.S. backing of Israel thus became a core grievance fueling popular anger. That anger was further inflamed by other U.S. actions: support for unpopular rulers, military interventions, and sanctions in the regionciaotest.cc.columbia.edu. In short, by the end of the Cold War the United States was widely distrusted in the Middle East not only for its close alliance with Israel, but also for a pattern of interference seen as trampling on Arab and Muslim sovereignty.

Iran’s Islamist Revolution: Hostility Beyond Israel?

Iran offers a case study of whether U.S. support for Israel is the decisive factor in animosity, or merely one factor among many. During the rule of the pro-Western Shah (1941–1979), Iran and Israel were de facto allies – Iran even supplied Israel with oil and received Israeli military assistancedw.com. However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution utterly transformed Tehran’s posture. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s regime broke ties with Israel (labeling it the “Little Satan”) and denounced the United States as the “Great Satan”brookings.edu. Khomeini’s animus toward America was rooted partly in grievances predating Israel’s role: the CIA-backed coup in 1953 that toppled Prime Minister Mosaddegh, decades of U.S. support for the Shah’s repressive government, and a broader rejection of Western political dominance. Even without Israel, a revolutionary Iran likely would have been hostile to Washington on ideological grounds (anti-imperialism and anti-Western sentiment).

Nonetheless, anti-Israel ideology became a cornerstone of Iran’s foreign policy after 1979. Khomeini saw opposing Zionism as a religious and revolutionary duty. The new Iranian regime became “a vocal supporter of Palestinians” and champion of the Palestinian causealjazeera.com. Tehran’s leaders calculated that unwavering resistance to Israel would rally the broader Muslim world behind Iran’s leadership. As one analysis notes, Iran’s staunch anti-Israel stance has “ideological, religious, and strategic” motivations – it reflects genuine sympathy with Palestinians and anger at Israel’s ties to the hated Shah, but it also offers “obvious structural advantages”brookings.edu. By casting its struggle in Islamic terms (Muslims vs. a non-Muslim oppressor), Iran shifts regional fault lines away from Persian–Arab ethnic tensions. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict became a useful rallying banner for Iran to bridge Sunni–Shia and Arab–Persian divides. “By carrying the mantle of unwavering resistance to Israel (and the United States) Iran can…appeal to solidarity with most Arabs,” exploiting a unifying cause across the Middle Eastbrookings.edu. In effect, Israel is a “useful enemy” for Tehran’s theocratic regime, diverting popular ire toward an external foe and legitimizing Iran’s intervention across the regionbrookings.edu.

Tehran and Tel Aviv became bitter enemies after 1979. Iran’s Islamic Republic refashioned foreign policy around opposition to Israel and the United States.aljazeera.com

Despite this focus on Israel, Iran’s clerical rulers still deem the U.S. their primary adversary. Supreme Leader Khamenei has often reiterated Khomeini’s slogan that “America is the Great Satan.” Iranian leaders perceive the U.S. as a global threat to their revolutionary regime and Islamic values – a view reinforced by U.S. sanctions, military encirclement, and efforts to contain Iran. Notably, Iran’s close proxies such as Hezbollah have been explicit that U.S. enmity goes even deeper than hatred of Israel. In Hezbollah’s own manifesto, confronting America is described as “the main root of evil,” with Israel seen as merely “an American tool…a forward military base” of Washingtonatlanticcouncil.org. This suggests that even absent the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Iran’s Islamist camp would likely maintain a hostile stance toward the U.S. due to broader ideological and geopolitical reasons (opposition to Western hegemony, secular capitalism, and past American meddling in Muslim lands)atlanticcouncil.org. However, Iran’s fierce anti-Israel policy has undeniably intensified and popularized its anti-American narrative. By championing Palestine and attacking Israel’s legitimacy, Tehran also strikes at the United States – Israel’s “closest ally” – thus tying the two targets together in the minds of its followersaljazeera.com.

Hezbollah and the “Axis of Resistance”

Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi’a militia-party formed in the early 1980s, epitomizes how U.S. and Israeli enemies often overlap through policy entanglement. Backed by Iran, Hezbollah arose to resist Israel’s 1982 invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon. The group’s ideology is intensely anti-Israeli – it refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist and justifies armed struggle until Israel is destroyed. Yet strikingly, Hezbollah’s leaders frequently describe America as the greater foe. Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has declared that “America’s right place is that of ‘the primary enemy, the Greatest Satan.’” In Hezbollah’s founding 1985 Open Letter, “confrontation with America” is set as the ultimate measure of the group’s missionatlanticcouncil.org. Analysts note that Hezbollah’s antipathy to Israel, while extreme, is in a sense “secondary” to its hatred of the United Statesatlanticcouncil.org.

Why would a Lebanese militia fighting Israeli troops place the U.S. at the forefront of its enemy list? The answer lies in Hezbollah’s integration into Iran’s revolutionary worldview. Hezbollah regards itself as part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” – a coalition of Iran and its allied militias (Hezbollah, some Iraqi militias, Syria’s regime, Hamas, etc.) united against U.S.-Israeli influence in the Middle Eastbrookings.edu. In Hezbollah’s eyes, Israel is not an independent adversary but an arm of American imperialism in the region. Nasrallah often frames Israel as “the Zionist entity” implanted by Western powers to subjugate Muslims, and thus sees no real distinction between fighting Israeli forces in Lebanon and fighting American forces (like the U.S. Marines once stationed in Beirut). Indeed, Hezbollah’s first notorious attacks – the 1983 suicide bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut – targeted Americans in retaliation for U.S. political/military support of the Lebanese government and Israel’s interventionwashingtoninstitute.org. To Hezbollah, those Marines were legitimate targets because they were perceived as allies of Israel and enemies of the Lebanese Shi’a community.

Over the decades, Hezbollah has maintained its fierce anti-American stance regardless of changing U.S. administrations or policiesatlanticcouncil.org. Thus, U.S. support for Israel has helped make Hezbollah and Washington bitter enemies, but that enmity is reinforced by deeper civilizational and ideological conflict as well.

Palestinian Militants: Hamas and the Centrality of Israel

For Palestinian militant groups like Hamas, the conflict with Israel is obviously the primary motivator for resistance. Hamas formed in 1987 as an Islamist movement to fight Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Its animosity toward the United States is largely a byproduct of the U.S.-Israel alliance. Hamas does not have global ambitions; its focus is liberating Palestine. However, since the U.S. unequivocally backs Israel both diplomatically and militarily, Hamas views America as complicit in the oppression of Palestinians. Hamas leaders have repeatedly condemned Washington’s bias and warned that by supporting Israel’s actions, Western countries make themselves targets. For instance, senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri stated in early 2024 that if the West and U.S. “do not stop their support for Israel, [the Muslim] nation will view them as an enemy, just like the Zionist occupation.” He cautioned that continued American backing for Israel could cause the conflict to “expand…beyond the borders of Palestine”daily8.com. In other words, Hamas explicitly ties potential violence against Americans to U.S. policies: the more the U.S. arms and shields Israel, the more Hamas and its sympathizers will treat the U.S. as a legitimate foe.

During the 2000s, Hamas mostly confined its attacks to Israeli targets, and it did not directly engage U.S. forces. But it verbally supported Al-Qaeda’s anti-American rhetoric at times and benefited from the broad climate of anger that U.S. policies generated in the Muslim world. Notably, when the Trump administration recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017, it sparked protests in Gaza and the West Bank, and Hamas called for a “Day of Rage” against American interests. Hamas and other Palestinian factions see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as central in motivating anti-U.S. sentiment among ordinary Arabs and Muslims. Polling consistently shows that America’s perceived one-sided support for Israel is a major cause of negative views of the U.S. in Arab countrieswashingtoninstitute.org. Even Arab governments that align with Washington face public discontent on this issue. For example, during the Gaza wars, U.S. favorability in the Arab world has plummeted to historic lows, cited as a direct consequence of U.S. backing for Israel’s military campaignswashingtoninstitute.org. This broad popular anger provides a recruiting tool and source of legitimacy for militant groups. Hamas leverages pan-Islamic solidarity with Palestine to pressure U.S.-allied Arab regimes and to justify any potential strikes on U.S. targets as part of the same struggle against Zionism and its supporters.

That said, if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were magically resolved or U.S. policy toward it drastically changed, Hamas’s quarrel with the faraway United States might largely dissipate. Unlike Iran or Al-Qaeda, Hamas’s charter does not include a general jihad against the West – its hostility is very much tied to the “entanglement” of the U.S. with Israel. The group has even indicated at times that it would not seek conflict with America if Washington ceased propping up Israel’s occupation. In practice, though, U.S. policy has remained staunchly pro-Israel, so Hamas continues to view America as, in the words of one official, “as much an enemy as [Israeli Prime Minister] Netanyahu”daily8.com.

Al-Qaeda and Global Jihad: U.S. Bases, Holy Lands, and Israel

Al-Qaeda and its fellow Sunni jihadist movements demonstrate that anti-American militancy can arise from U.S. actions independent of Israel – while still invoking Israel as a grievance. Osama bin Laden’s fatwas and statements in the 1990s make this clear. In his 1996 declaration of war and the 1998 “World Islamic Front” fatwa, bin Laden listed three primary offenses by the United States: (1) the occupation of the Arabian Peninsula (U.S. troops based in Saudi Arabia since the 1991 Gulf War), which he viewed as a desecration of Islam’s holy land; (2) U.S.-led economic sanctions and bombings devastating Iraq in the 1990s (what he termed American massacres of Iraqi Muslims); and (3) U.S. support for Israel’s domination of Jerusalem and oppression of Palestiniansirp.fas.org. In bin Laden’s words, “the Americans’ aim is also to serve the Jews’ petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem…destroying Iraq…to guarantee Israel’s survival”irp.fas.org. Thus, Al-Qaeda’s animus combined both the Israeli-Palestinian issue and other U.S. interventions.

Importantly, bin Laden often emphasized the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia as the immediate trigger for declaring jihad. The U.S. military buildup on Saudi soil during and after Operation Desert Storm (1990–91) outraged him and many Islamists, who saw it as infidel troops polluting the land of Mecca and Medina. This grievance existed entirely apart from Israel. Had there been no Israeli-Palestinian conflict at all, the stationing of American soldiers near Islam’s holiest sites might still have produced a violent backlash from figures like bin Laden. Indeed, Al-Qaeda’s first major attacks (the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) and the 9/11 attacks in 2001 were aimed squarely at American targets in response to U.S. policies in the Muslim world – including but not limited to support for Israel. In a 2002 open letter explaining “Why we fight you,” bin Laden explicitly cited U.S. support for Israel as a prime motivator, alongside the oppression of Muslims in places like Somalia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the presence of U.S. forces in the Gulfen.wikipedia.org. American backing of Israel was described as part of a broader U.S. war against Islam, from Al-Qaeda’s perspective. The 9/11 Commission Report and other analyses concur that these policy grievances – “particularly…support of Israel” – were used by Al-Qaeda to justify attacking the United Statesen.wikipedia.org.

At the same time, Al-Qaeda was not solely driven by Israel. Many of its recruits were radicalized by the carnage in Iraq during the 1990s sanctions or Russia’s brutal war in Chechnya, or by authoritarian Arab regimes (like Egypt and Saudi Arabia) which the U.S. propped up. Al-Qaeda’s ideology envisions a civilizational clash against all “Crusaders and Jews,” suggesting even if the U.S. had no ties to Israel, a clash might have occurred due to U.S. military actions in Muslim countries and general Western cultural influence. It is telling that ISIS, which emerged from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, initially gave little priority to Palestine. During its heyday (2014–2017), ISIS focused on conquering territory in Syria/Iraq and waging war against “near enemies” (Shia governments, other Muslim sects, and Western troops on the ground). ISIS propaganda threatened to eventually “liberate Jerusalem,” but in practice the group rarely attacked Israel, instead directing its wrath at U.S. and European targets and local foes. This underlines that American military intervention (like the 2003 invasion of Iraq) created its own wave of hatred and terrorism that was not fundamentally about Israel. As one scholar noted, “Palestine was listed among Osama bin Laden’s grievances…along with other Muslim territories,” but Al-Qaeda’s operational focus often lay elsewherehudson.org. The Israeli issue was sometimes strategically magnified in jihadist rhetoric to rally broader Muslim supporttandfonline.com, yet the core of groups like Al-Qaeda was a radical anti-Americanism fueled by multiple factors (presence on the Arabian Peninsula, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, support for corrupt regimes, etc.). In sum, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a crucial motivator for global jihadists, but not the sole one – they likely would harbor great enmity for the U.S. due to other policies even if Israel did not exist. However, Israel’s existence and America’s patronage of it certainly add emotional resonance and unity to their cause.

U.S. Military Presence and Other Independent Sources of Enmity

Beyond Israel, a number of distinct U.S. actions have independently fostered anti-American sentiment and violent opposition in the Middle East:

• Bases in Saudi Arabia: As discussed, the post-1991 basing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia (to contain Saddam Hussein) was perceived by many Muslims as an occupation of sacred land. This was perhaps the single biggest catalyst for Al-Qaeda’s declaration of jihadirp.fas.org. It had nothing to do with Israel directly, but Israel’s security benefited indirectly from U.S. containment of Iraq, which bin Laden cynically pointed out as evidence of an American-Zionist agendairp.fas.org.

• The Iraq Wars: U.S.-led wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and the harsh sanctions in the interim, caused immense Iraqi civilian suffering. The perception that America destroyed an Arab country – motivated by oil and power – inflamed Arab public opinion. Even Arabs who disliked Saddam viewed the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 as an unjust aggression. This spawned new insurgent enemies of the U.S. (e.g. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which later became ISIS) who fought American troops on Iraqi soil largely for reasons unrelated to Israel. The Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal, civilian casualties from U.S. bombings, and the long occupation cemented an image of America as a violator of Muslim lands. Militias in Iraq (some backed by Iran) attacked U.S. forces to expel the “occupier,” linking their struggle with a broader resistance that also includes fighting Israel’s occupation of Palestine. In the eyes of groups like Iran’s allies, the U.S. occupation of Iraq and Israel’s occupation of Arab land are two sides of the same coin of American imperialismatlanticcouncil.org.

• Support for Authoritarian Regimes: For decades, the U.S. propped up friendly dictators and monarchs in the Middle East (the Shah of Iran, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, the Saudi royal family, etc.). This was done for strategic reasons, but it bred resentment among populations who suffered under those regimes. Islamists and opposition groups blamed America for thwarting political freedom and Islamic governance. For example, Egyptian jihadist groups in the 1990s cited U.S. support for Mubarak as justification for anti-U.S. terrorism. Similarly, Iran’s revolutionaries in 1979 targeted the U.S. embassy largely because of American backing for the despised Shah. These grievances could exist entirely apart from Israel – they are about national dignity and self-determination. Arab intellectuals often list U.S. hypocrisy (talking democracy but backing tyrants) as a root cause of anti-American angerciaotest.cc.columbia.edu.

• Perceived War on Islam: U.S. actions like the invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and the global war on terror – including drone strikes in Pakistan/Yemen and the detention of Muslims in Guantanamo Bay – have fed a narrative that America is at war with Islam itself. Militant propaganda frequently references these events, in tandem with Palestine, to galvanize recruits. While Israel is part of that narrative (Palestine seen as a victim of Judeo-Christian crusaders), the conflict is much broader. For instance, Al-Qaeda accused the U.S. of leading a “Crusader-Zionist alliance” against Muslims worldwidewww2.kenyon.edu.

In weighing these factors, one study concluded that Arabs give three main reasons for their antipathy toward America: (1) U.S. support for Israel that enables Israeli occupation and victory over Arabs, (2) U.S. military attacks/sanctions on Muslim countries (like Iraq) and direct occupations, and (3) U.S. backing of undemocratic regimes and military presence in the regionciaotest.cc.columbia.edu In this conspiratorial view, every U.S. move is connected back to either protecting Israel or controlling oil – hence anti-U.S. hostility would likely persist unless both those grievances are addressed.

An Iranian demonstrator holds an anti-US sign during a protest in Tehran (2015). Iranian and Arab public anger at the United States often peaks during times of perceived American bias toward Israel or military intervention in the region.washingtoninstitute.org

Shared Enemies and Shifting Alliances: Natural Allies or Policy Entanglement?

Do the enemies of the United States naturally become the enemies of Israel (and vice versa), creating an automatic alliance among them? The historical evidence suggests that while there is significant overlap, it is often driven by strategic calculations and “policy entanglement” rather than intrinsic unity. In many cases, Washington and Tel Aviv share the same adversaries largely because the U.S. and Israel are so closely allied – any group fighting one is likely to offend the other.

Examples of convergence: Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas – despite differences (Shia vs. Sunni) – have forged a tactical alliance under Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” precisely because they all oppose Israel and the U.S. Iran supplies money and weapons to Hamas (a Sunni Palestinian group) and Hezbollah (a Shia Lebanese group) to strengthen a broad front against Israeli and American influencebrookings.edu. Here, an enemy of Israel (Hamas) became an ally of Iran due to shared anti-Israel, anti-U.S. aims, even though normally Iranian Shi’a and Sunni Islamists might be rivals. This shows that common hostility toward Israel and the U.S. can bridge ideological gulfs. Likewise, when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was confronted by a U.S.-led coalition in 1991, Saddam tried to portray himself as a champion against Israel – firing Scud missiles at Israel and linking the Gulf War to the Palestinian cause – in hopes of rallying Arab support. Saddam and Palestinian groups were not natural partners (Ba’athist Iraq was secular-nationalist, often at odds with Islamists), but opposition to the U.S.-Israel camp pushed them into a loose alignment of convenience.

On the other hand, there are instances where sharing enemies did not produce cooperation due to deeper divisions. Al-Qaeda and Iran both oppose the U.S. and Israel, yet they are bitter foes of each other (Sunni extremist Al-Qaeda reviles Shia Iran as heretical; Iran distrusted Al-Qaeda, even aiding the U.S. against the Taliban in 2001). Their mutual hatred of America did not make them allies; in fact, Al-Qaeda in Iraq slaughtered Shia (Iranian protégés) even as Iran quietly aided some Sunni insurgents against American troops. This indicates that U.S. and Israeli enemies are not automatically on the same side – ideological, sectarian, or nationalist rifts can keep them apart. In those cases, the U.S. and Israel may share the same enemies, but those enemies do not share each other as friends. For example, Syria’s Assad regime and Islamist rebels both detest Israel, but they fought each other brutally during the Syrian civil war despite both being anti-Western.

In recent years, we have also seen shifting alliances where some traditional Arab adversaries of Israel have moved closer to Israel due to a common threat from Iran, which is a foe of both the U.S. and Israel. This led to the so-called “reverse periphery” strategy: Israel has quietly partnered with Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who now see Iran as the greater enemy than Israelbrookings.edu. The old notion that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” is at play – Iran’s hostility pushed Gulf Arabs and Israel into an alignment alongside the United States. Here, Israel and the U.S. share Iran as an enemy, and Israel’s former enemies (certain Arab states) became de facto allies of the U.S.-Israel side. This realignment underscores that the map of Middle Eastern enmity is not fixed; it is heavily influenced by policy choices and perceived hierarchies of threat. When U.S. and Israeli policies align (as they typically do), their enemy list often aligns too – but if U.S. policy were to diverge (for instance, if America stopped supporting Israel), some groups might drop their hostility toward the U.S. even while continuing to fight Israel. Conversely, if an actor makes peace with the U.S., it might lose support from others who remain anti-American.

In summary, many of Israel’s enemies have become America’s enemies because of the U.S.-Israel alliance (Hamas being labeled a terrorist group by Washington, for example). And many enemies of the U.S. (like Iran) focus on Israel because of its closeness to America. These are largely policy entanglements. There is nothing “natural” about a secular Arab nationalist like Saddam Hussein aligning with an Islamist movement like Hamas, or a Sunni jihadist like bin Laden aligning with Shi’ite Hezbollah – except for the convenience of fighting a common opponent. When those geopolitical circumstances change, today’s enemies can be tomorrow’s partners. The “Axis of Resistance” itself has shown strain when interests diverge, but as long as the U.S. and Israel act in concert, their foes have incentive to coordinate as well.

Conclusion

From the mid-20th century to today, hostility toward the United States in the Middle East has been driven by a complex interplay of factors – with U.S. support for Israel at center stage, but not alone. The enduring plight of the Palestinians and America’s role in it has unquestionably been “at the centre of the hostilities for decades,” serving as a potent symbol and rallying cry against the U.S.aljazeera.com. Many militant groups and angry publics see the United States and Israel as virtually interchangeable adversaries, given the tight alliance between the two. However, history suggests that anti-American enmity would not disappear even if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were resolved. Other U.S. actions – military interventions, stationing of troops in holy lands, toppling of governments, backing of autocrats – have each created their own legacy of resentment and resistance. Iran’s Islamist regime would likely continue to oppose U.S. “hegemony” in the Gulf due to its revolutionary ideology and memories of U.S. meddling, even without Israel in the equationaljazeera.com. Sunni jihadists might still target the U.S. for its presence in Muslim countries and its global cultural influence, even if they could no longer cite Palestine in their propaganda.

That said, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains uniquely emotive and unifying. It is often the gateway grievance that makes broader anti-U.S. narratives resonate with the “Arab street.” U.S. support for Israel’s wars and occupation has alienated even moderate Arabs and Muslims, eroding America’s reputation and credibilitywashingtoninstitute.org. This suggests that resolving or ameliorating that conflict could significantly diminish the breadth of anti-American sentiment, even if hardcore ideologues would find other pretexts. Conversely, as long as the U.S. is seen as enabling Israeli oppression of Palestinians, militant groups will have a ready-made justification – in their eyes and their recruits’ eyes – to target Americans.

Finally, regarding alignment of enemies: the overlap between U.S. and Israeli foes is largely a product of strategic choices and alliances rather than inherent destiny. Enemies do cooperate when it suits them (forming axes of convenience against a stronger force), but ideological and sectarian divides can prevent a monolithic anti-U.S./Israel front. The U.S. and Israel share many enemies today chiefly because American policy has intertwined itself with Israel’s fate. Thus, “U.S. and Israeli enemies” often become mutual enemies by default – but that is a symptom of policy entanglement. In a different world where the U.S. was neutral on Israel or less interventionist in the region, some of those actors might not automatically be hostile to Washington. In reality, however, the last 75 years have tightly bound U.S. actions to Middle Eastern perceptions. Anti-American hostility has multiple fathers – from support for Israel to boots on the ground in Arabia – and each has reinforced the other. Both drivers must be acknowledged to fully answer “why they hate us.” Solving one without the other would still leave significant – if reduced – enmity toward the United States among Middle Eastern hardliners.

Sources: Middle East Review of International Affairsciaotest.cc.columbia.edu; Barry Rubin in Foreign Affairswww2.kenyon.edu; Al Jazeera and DW reportsdw.com; Brookings Institution analysisbrookings.edu; Atlantic Council (Daoud)atlanticcouncil.org; MEMRI translations of Hamas statementsen.wikipedia.org; Washington Institute polling datawashingtoninstitute.org; and others as cited above.